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第一节听下面5段对话。每段对话后有一个小题，从题中所给的A、B、C三个选项中选出最佳选项，并标在试卷的相应位置。听完每段对话后，你都有10秒钟的时间来回答有关小题和阅读下一小题。每段对话仅读一遍。 Which shirt does the man want to buy
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Consider the following statements, made by the same man eight years apart. "Eventually, being ’poor’ won’t be as much a matter of living in a poor country as it will be a matter of having poor skills." That was Bill Gates talking in 1992. Way back then, the Microsoft chairman’s image was that of a rather harsh, libertarian-leaning fellow who proudly declared his products alone would "change the world." When asked what he would do with his billions, the boy wonder of Silicon Valley used to shrug off the question, saying his long workdays didn’t leave time for charity. But now listen to the same Gates-or perhaps not quite the same Gages-talking in the fall of 2000: Whenever the computer industry has a panel about the digital divide and I’m on the panel, I always think, "OK, you want to send computers to Africa, what about food and electricity-those computers aren’t going to be that valuable"... The mothers are going to walk right up to that computer and say: "My children are dying, what can you do" Yes, even Bill Gates, the iconic capitalist of our day, seems to have come around. The self-assured Gates of 1992 was obviously a man of his times, confident of his industry’s ability to change the world, certain that the power of markets and new technology, once unleashed, would address most of the world’s ills. But the more skeptical Gates of the new millennium is someone who evinces a passion for giving and government aid. He shares a growing realization, even in the multibillionaire set, that something is amiss with the ideology that has prevailed since the end of the cold war: global-capitalism-as-panacea. Way back then, the Microsoft chairman’s image was that of a rather harsh, libertarian-leaning fellow who proudly declared his products alone would "change the world.”
证券持有期收益率和到期收益率两者含义、计算相同。 ( )
Consider the following statements, made by the same man eight years apart. "Eventually, being ’poor’ won’t be as much a matter of living in a poor country as it will be a matter of having poor skills." That was Bill Gates talking in 1992. Way back then, the Microsoft chairman’s image was that of a rather harsh, libertarian-leaning fellow who proudly declared his products alone would "change the world." When asked what he would do with his billions, the boy wonder of Silicon Valley used to shrug off the question, saying his long workdays didn’t leave time for charity. But now listen to the same Gates-or perhaps not quite the same Gages-talking in the fall of 2000: Whenever the computer industry has a panel about the digital divide and I’m on the panel, I always think, "OK, you want to send computers to Africa, what about food and electricity-those computers aren’t going to be that valuable"... The mothers are going to walk right up to that computer and say: "My children are dying, what can you do" Yes, even Bill Gates, the iconic capitalist of our day, seems to have come around. The self-assured Gates of 1992 was obviously a man of his times, confident of his industry’s ability to change the world, certain that the power of markets and new technology, once unleashed, would address most of the world’s ills. But the more skeptical Gates of the new millennium is someone who evinces a passion for giving and government aid. He shares a growing realization, even in the multibillionaire set, that something is amiss with the ideology that has prevailed since the end of the cold war: global-capitalism-as-panacea. The self-assured Gates of 1992 was obviously a man of his times, confident of his industry’s ability to change the world, certain that the power of markets and new technology, once unleashed, would address most of the world’s ills.
In the coming decades, Europe’s influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited, and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined. Certainly, one reason for NATO’s increasing marginalization stems from the behavior of its European members. With NATO, critical decisions are still made nationally; much of the talk about a common defense policy remains just that—talk. There is little specialization or coordination. Missing as well are many of the logistical and intelligence assets needed to project military force on distant battlefields. With the Cold War and the Soviet threat a distant memory, there is little political willingness, on a country-by-country basis, to provide adequate public funds to the military. Political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in-southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes precedence. No doubt, Europe’s security challenges are geographically, politically and psychologically less immediate to the population than its economic ones. Mounting financial problems and the imperative to cut deficits are sure to limit what Europeans can do militarily beyond their continent. It is true that the era in which Europe and transatlantic relations dominated U.S. foreign policy is over. Political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes precedence.
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