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In the coming decades, Europe’s influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited, and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined. Certainly, one reason for NATO’s increasing marginalization stems from the behavior of its European members. With NATO, critical decisions are still made nationally; much of the talk about a common defense policy remains just that—talk. There is little specialization or coordination. Missing as well are many of the logistical and intelligence assets needed to project military force on distant battlefields. With the Cold War and the Soviet threat a distant memory, there is little political willingness, on a country-by-country basis, to provide adequate public funds to the military. Political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in-southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes precedence. No doubt, Europe’s security challenges are geographically, politically and psychologically less immediate to the population than its economic ones. Mounting financial problems and the imperative to cut deficits are sure to limit what Europeans can do militarily beyond their continent. It is true that the era in which Europe and transatlantic relations dominated U.S. foreign policy is over. Political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes precedence.
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A proposal to change long-standing federal policy and deny citizenship to babies born to illegal immigrants on U.S. soil ran aground this month in Congress, but it is sure to resurface-kindling bitter debate even if it fails to become law. At issue is "birthright citizenship" —provided for since the Constitution’s 14th Amendment was ratified in 1868. Section 1 of that amendment, drafted with freed slaves in mind, says: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." Some conservatives in Congress, as well as advocacy groups seeking to crack down on illegal immigration, say the amendment has been misapplied over the years, that it was never intended to grant citizenship automatically to babies of illegal immigrants. Thus they contend that federal legislation, rather than a difficult-to-achieve constitutional amendment, would be sufficient to end birthright citizenship. "Most Americans feel it doesn’t make any sense for people to come into the country illegally, give birth and have a new U.S. citizen," said the spokesman of the federation of American immigration reform. "But the advocates for illegal immigrants will make a fuss; they’ll claim you’re punishing the children, and I suspect the leadership doesn’t want to deal with that.\ Most Americans feel it doesn’t make any sense for people to come into the country illegally, give birth and have a new U.S. citizen, said the spokesman of the federation of American immigration reform. "But the advocates for illegal immigrants will make a fuss; they’ll claim you’re punishing the children, and I suspect the leadership doesn’t want to deal with that.\
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France today is no superpower, but French influence in some spheres significant. Nothing has cemented French influence in the world like the decision made by the victorious World War Ⅱ powers in 1945 to include France as one of the five permanent, veto-wielding members of the Security Council. Until the end of the Cold War, France rarely found itself in disagreement with or the U.S. on major issues. But the U.N. veto today takes on larger significance as France struggles to decide whether it wants to lead the European Union in defiance of American power or in partnership with it. As America’s great media outlets have begun preparing for coverage of the D-Day celebrations, the question of a "grand gesture" by the French toward the American war in Iraq has been raised. Administration officials hint that, perhaps, just perhaps, the French President will use the occasion of France’s rescue as an opportunity to square the accounts-to issue a blanket endorsement of America’s plan for Iraq’s future and throw its support behind the transfer of power looming at the end of the month. France certainly wants the United States to be successful in Iraq at this point. But France seems unlikely to see D-Day as an opportunity to make good on a 60-year-old debt. Beyond nice speeches and some truly fine cuisine, don’t expect France to liberate America from Iraq. Until the end of the Cold War, France rarely found itself in disagreement with or the U.S. on major issues.
In the coming decades, Europe’s influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited, and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined. Certainly, one reason for NATO’s increasing marginalization stems from the behavior of its European members. With NATO, critical decisions are still made nationally; much of the talk about a common defense policy remains just that—talk. There is little specialization or coordination. Missing as well are many of the logistical and intelligence assets needed to project military force on distant battlefields. With the Cold War and the Soviet threat a distant memory, there is little political willingness, on a country-by-country basis, to provide adequate public funds to the military. Political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in-southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes precedence. No doubt, Europe’s security challenges are geographically, politically and psychologically less immediate to the population than its economic ones. Mounting financial problems and the imperative to cut deficits are sure to limit what Europeans can do militarily beyond their continent. It is true that the era in which Europe and transatlantic relations dominated U.S. foreign policy is over. In the coming decades, Europe’s influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited, and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined.
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