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甲公司向乙公司购买价值100万元的彩电,合同约定甲公司先预付20万元货款,其余80万元货款在提货后3个月内付清,并由丙公司提供连带保证担保,但未约定保证范围。提货1个月后,甲公司在征得乙公司同意后,将80万元债务转移给尚欠其80万元货款的丁公司。对此,丙公司完全不知情。至债务清偿期届满时,乙公司要求丁公司偿还80万元货款及其利息,而丁公司因违法经营被依法查处,法定代表人不知去向,公司的账户被冻结。于是,乙公司找到丙公司,要求其承担保证责任,丙公司至此才知道甲公司已将其债务转让给丁公司,遂以此为由拒绝承担责任。双方为此发生争议,乙公司诉至法院。 问: 若乙公司将其80万元债权依法转让给戊公司,而未经保证人丙公司同意,则丙公司是否继续承担保证责任 为什么

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请在“答题”菜单中选择“电子表格”命令,然后按照题目要求打开相应的命令,完成下面的内容,具体要求如下: 打开文件EXl.XLS文档,将工作表Sheet的A1:E1单元格合并为一个单元格,内容水平居中,计算“合计”列的内容(合计=基本工资+岗位工资+书报费);将A2:E8单元格区域格式设置为自动套用格式“会计1”,将工作表命名为“职工工资表”。

根据以下资料回答下列问题: 吴先生开了一家小吃店(个体工商户),打算让妻子来帮忙,夫妇二人每月均领取3500元的工资,预计小吃店在2012年的经营利润为10万元,为了降低税负,吴先生请理财师小张帮助进行税务筹划。 若夫妇二人采用合伙制经营小店,二人的月工资均增加到5000元,经营利润变为64000元,则吴先生夫妇在2012年需要缴纳个人所得税共计______元。

A. 20250
B. 18500
C. 12500
D. 6250

OLTP表示联机事务处理,侧重于数据管理,而OLAP表示 【11】 ,侧重于数据分析和决策支持。

This spring, disaster loomed in the global food market. Precipitous increases in the prices of staples like rice (up more than a hundred and fifty percent in a few months) and maize provoked food riots, toppled governments, and threatened the lives of tens of millions. But the bursting of the commodity bubble eased those pressures, and food prices, while still high, have come well off the astronomical levels they hit in April. For American, the drop in commodity prices has put a few more bucks in people’s pockets; in much of the developing world, it may have saved many from actually starving. So did the global financial crisis solve the global food crisis Temporarily, perhaps. But the recent price drop doesn’t provide any long-term respite from the threat food shortages or future price spikes. Nor has it reassured anyone about the health of the global agricultural system, which the crisis revealed as dangerously unstable. Four decades after the Green Revolution, and after waves of market reforms intended to transform agricultural production, we’re still having a hard time insuring that people simply get enough to eat, and we seen to be vulnerable to supply shocks than ever. It wasn’t supposed to be this way. Over the past two decades, countries around the world have moved away from their focus on "food security" and handed market forces a greater rote in shaping agricultural policy. Before the nineteen-eighties, developing countries had so-called "agricultural marketing boards", which would buy commodities from farmers at fixed prices (prices high enough to keep farmers farming), and then store them in strategic reserves that could be used in the event of bad harvests or soaring import prices. But in the eighties and nineties, often as part of structural-adjustment programs imposed by the I.M.F. or the World Blank, many marketing boards were eliminated or cut back, and grain reserves, deemed inefficient and unnecessary, were sold off. In the same way, structural-adjustment programs often did away with government investment in and subsidies to agriculture--more notably, subsidies for things like fertilizers and high-yield seeds.. The logic behind these reforms was simple: the market would allocate resources more efficiently than government, leading to greater productivity. Farmers, instead of growing subsidized maize and wheat at high cost, could concentrate on cash crops, like cashews and chocolate, and use the money they made to buy staple foods. If a country couldn’t compete in the global economy, production would migrate to countries that could. it was also assumed that, once governments stepped out of the way, private investment would flood into agriculture, boosting performance. And international aid seemed a more efficient way of relieving food crises than relying in countries to maintain surpluses and food-security programs, which are wasteful and costly. This "marketization" of agriculture has not, to be sure, been fully carried through. Subsidies are still endemic in rich countries and poor, while developing countries often place tariffs on imported food, which benefit their farmers but drive up prices for consumers. And in extreme circumstance countries restrict exports, hoarding food for their own citizens. Nonetheless, we clearly have a leaner, more market-friendly agriculture system than before. It looks, in fact, a bit like global manufacturing, with low inventories (wheat stocks are at their lowest since 1977), concentrated production (three countries provide ninety percent of corn exports, and five countries provide eighty percent of rice exports,) and fewer redundancies. Governments have a much smaller role, and public spending on agriculture has been cut sharply. The problem is that, while this system is undeniably more efficient, it’s also much more fragile. Bad weather in just a few countries can wreak havoc across the entire system. When prices spike as they did this spring, the result is food shortages and malnutrition in poorer countries, since they are far more dependent on imports and have few food reserves to draw on. And, while higher prices and market reforms were supposed to bring a boom in agricultural productivity, global crop yields actually rose less between 1990 and 2007 than they did in the previous twenty years, in part because in many developing countries private-sector agricultural investment never materialized, while the cutbacks in government spending left them with feeble infrastructures. These changes did not cause the rising prices of the past couple of years, but they have made them more damaging. The old emphasis on food security was undoubtedly costly, and often wasteful. But the redundancies it created also had tremendous value when things went wrong. And one sure thing about a system as complex as agriculture is that things will go wrong, often with devastating consequences. If the just-in-time system for producing cars runs into a hitch and the supply of cars shrinks for a while, people can easily adapt. When the same happens with food, people go hungry or even starve. That doesn’ t mean that we need to embrace price controls or collective farms, and there are sensible market reforms, like doing away with import tariffs, that would make developing-country consumers better off. But a few weeks ago Bill Clinton, no enemy of market reform, got it right when he said that we should help countries achieve "maximum agricultural self-sufficiency". Instead of a more efficient system. We should be trying to build a more reliable one. What can be learned from the first paragraph

A. Global financial crisis destabilized governments.
B. Food riots resulted from skyrocketing food bills.
C. Financial crisis worsened food crisis.
D. Food prices surged by 150% in April.

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