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在国际社会共同努力下，世界经济正在缓慢复苏，但复苏基础不牢固，进展不平衡，存在较大的不确定性。与此同时，本地区经济发展也面临一些难题和挑战，发达国家就业形势严峻，新兴市场国家面临资产价格泡沫和通货膨胀压力，最不发达国家处境艰难，各成员国经济结构调整任重道远。
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当今世界，既非丝绸之路时代，亦非马可·波罗时代。昔日遥远的距离，被现代科学技术一下缩短到令人难以置信的程度。这是人类文明进步的共同成果。不论是中国的还是外国的历史经验一再证明，文化需要交流。只有交流，才能相互学习，相互了解；只有交流，才能共同去促进人类智慧向前发展，并共同享用其成果。
The principle of the social character of the school as the basic factor in the moral education given may be also applied to the question of methods of instruction, not in their details, but in their general spirit. The emphasis then fells upon instruction and giving out, rather than upon absorption and mere learning. We fail to recognize how essentially individualistic the latter methods are, and how unconsciously, yet certainly and effectively, they react into the child’s ways of judging and of acting. Imagine forty children all engaged in reading the same books, and in preparing and reciting the same lessons day after day. Suppose this process constitutes by far the larger part of their work, and that they are continually judged from the standpoint of what they are able to take in a study hour and reproduce in a recitation hour. There is next to no opportunity for any social division of labor. There is no opportunity for each child to work out something specifically his own, which he may contribute to the common stock, while he participates in the productions of others. All are set to do exactly the same work and turn out the same products. The social spirit is not cultivated, in fact, in so far as the purely individualistic method gets in its work, it atrophies for lack of use. The child is born with a natural desire to give out, to do, to serve. When this tendency is not used, when conditions are such that other motives are substituted, the accumulation of an influence working against the social spirit is much larger than we have any idea of, especially when the burden of work, week after week, and year after year, falls upon this side.But lack of cultivation of the social spirit is not all. Positively individualistic motives and standards are inculcated. Some stimulus must be found to keep the child at his studies. At the best this will be his affection for his teacher, together with a feeling that he is not violating school rules, and thus negatively, if not positively, is contributing to the good of the school. I have nothing to say against these motives so far as they go, but they are inadequate. The relation between the piece of work to be done and affection for a third person is external, not intrinsic. It is therefore liable to break down whenever the external conditions are changed. Moreover, this attachment to a particular person may become so isolated and exclusive as to be selfish in quality. In any case, the child should gradually grow out of this relatively external motive into an appreciation, for its own sake, of the social value of what he has to do, because of its larger relations to life, not pinned down to two or three persons.But, unfortunately, the motive is not always at this relative best, but mixed with lower motives which are distinctly egoistic. Fear is a motive which is almost sure to enter in, not necessarily physical fear, or fear of punishment, but fear of losing the approbation of others; or fear of failure, so extreme as to be morbid and paralyzing. On the other side, emulation and rivalry enter in. Just because all are doing the same work, and are judged (either in recitation or examination with reference to grading and to promotion) not from the standpoint of their personal contribution, but from that of comparative success, the feeling of superiority over others is unduly appealed to, while timid children are depressed. Children are judged with reference to their capacity to realize the same external standard. The weaker gradually lose their sense of power, and accept a position of continuous and persistent inferiority. The effect upon both self-respect and respect for work need not be dwelt upon. The strong learn to glory, not in their strength, but in the fact that they are stronger. In principle, the author argues （）.
The racial theory of civilization has ceased to be scientifically respectable. Today we only know it as a sophistical excuse for national pride and national hatred. The idea that there is a European race whose peculiar virtue render it fit to dominate the rest of the world, or an English race whose innate qualities make imperialism a duty, or a Nordic race whose predominance in America is the necessary condition of American greatness, and whose purity in Germany is indispensable to the purity of German culture, we know is scientifically baseless and politically disastrous. We know that physical anthropology and cultural anthropology are different studies, and we find it difficult to see how any one have confused them. Consequently we are not inclined to be grateful to Herder for having started so pernicious a doctrine.It would be possible to defend him by arguing that his theory of racial differences does not in itself give any ground for believing in the superiority of one race over another. One might argue that it only implies each type of man to have its own form of life, its own conception of happiness, and its own rhythm of historical development. On this showing, the social institutions and political forms of different peoples can differ without being intrinsically better or worse than one another, and the goodness of a certain political form is never an absolute goodness by only a goodness relative to the people that has created it.But this would not be a legitimate interpretation of Herder’s thought. It is essential to his whole point of view that the differences between the social and political institutions of different races are derived not from the historical experience of each race but from its innate psychological peculiarities, and this is fatal to a true understanding of history. The differentiations between different cultures which can be explained on these lines are not historical differentiations, like that between, say, Renaissance and Medieval cultures, but non-historical differentiations like that between a community of bees and a community of ants. Human nature has been divided up, but it is still human nature, still nature and not mind; and in terms of practical politics this means that the task of creating or improving a culture is assimilated to that of creating or improving a breed of domestic animals. Once Herder’s theory of race is accepted, there is no escaping the Nazi marriage laws.The problem which Herder bequeathed to his successors, therefore, was the problem of thinking out clearly the distinction between nature and man: nature as a process or sum of processes governed by laws which are blindly obeyed, man as a process or sum of processes governed (as Kant was to put it) not by law simply but by consciousness of law. It had to be shown that history is a process of this second type. that is to say, the life of man is an historical life because it is a mental and spiritual life.Herder’s first volume was published in the spring of 1784 when he was forty. Kant’s pupil had evidently read the book as soon as it appeared. Although Kant dissented from many of its doctrines, as his somewhat acid review was to show a year later, it did stimulate him to think for himself about the problems it raised and to write an essay of his own which constitutes his chief work on the philosophy of history. Kant was already sixty when he read the first part of the Ideen, and his mind had been formed by the Enlightenment as it took root in Germany under the aegis of Frederick the Great and of Voltaire, whom Frederick brought to the Prussian court. Hence Kant represents, as compared with Herder, a certain astringent tendency towards anti-Romanticism. In the true style of the Enlightenment, he regards past history as a spectacle of human irrationality and looks forward to a Utopia of rational life. What is really remarkable in him is the way in which he combines the Enlightenment point of view with the Romanticist, very much as in his theory of knowledge he combines rationalism and empiricism. According to the writer, how did Kant regard Herder’s work（）
The decades after 1830 were a period of disintegration and uncertainty in German philosophy. For almost half a century idealist philosophies, culminating in Hegel’s grandiose system, had dominated the philosophical scene, revolving around such spiritual notions as transcendental ego, consciousness, presentation (Vorstellung ) , idea, mind, and spirit (Geist). The rapid collapse of German Idealism—that "gigantic mountain range" of creative thought, as Husserl called it in 1917, was due to a combination of causes.There was in the first place, accelerated progress in the natural sciences, ranging from physiology (Johannes Muller, Ernst Weber) to physics (Robert Mayer, Hermann Helmholtz) and chemistry (Justus von Liebig, Friedrich Wöhler). The success of the experimental approach visibly demonstrated the futility of all idealistic speculation about nature. Secondly, there was the rapid growth of technology (especially the construction of railways and the invention of the telegraph), combined with the process of industrialization (resulting in tensions between capital and labour which led to radical changes in the economic system). Moreover, new political ideas concerning popular participation in government led first of all to the abortive revolution of 1848 and resulted finally in the unification of Germany after the war of 1866.Next to philosophical idealism, the other great loser in this course of events was Christianity, especially protestant Christianity, a long-standing ally of idealism. The vacuum thus produced was often filled by vulgar materialist ideas along the line of Ludwig Buchner’s Kraft und Stoff (1855). The more educated classes, however, had needs of a more refined nature, and they turned instead to Schopenhauerianism. Schopenhauer stood firmly in the great European tradition of idealism extending from Plato and Kant, but he nevertheless resolutely rejected post-Kantian, and more specifically Hegelian idealism. Schopenhauer combined the scientist’s conviction of a blind causality reigning in the world of nature with a view according to which this world is none the less rooted in a subjective bestowal of sense. He combined the democratic feeling of compassion for all mankind with an elitist view on art, and a belief in the ultimate meaninglessness of history with an ontology in which the will is fundamental. But above all his philosophy, while rating Christianity rather low, made room for religion on better soil. the religion of India.The view of Indian thought current among educated circles in the second half of the nineteenth century in Germany was strongly influenced by Schopenhauer. Not only did he give popular currency to expressions such as "nirvana" and "the veil of maya", but also he may also be held responsible for the current amalgamation of all ideas which blew into Europe from the East. Neither Hinduism and Buddhism nor Brahmanism and Vedanta philosophy were clearly distinguished by Schopenhauer. On one point, however, he was particularly firm. Buddhism is the highest religion in the world, because it is an "atheistic religion" .Thus it not only surpasses Christian theism, but also comes close to Schopenhauer’s own conception of the absolute. Schopenhauer’s followers in Germany were therefore able to look down on the parochial Christian rituals practised in their country, while upholding the claim that they, too, were directed toward some higher entity however, vaguely conceived. Moreover, they could feel themselves close to the Vedas and Upanisads, considered to be the oldest and most venerable documents of human thought, while at the same time feeling superior to these Indian "myths" as a result of their own rootedness in the purely philosophical ideas of the Schopenhauerian system.To illustrate all this, I want to quote from a document which not only exemplifies this widespread attitude, but also deviates from it in a significant way. It will moreover display the typical framework of Husserl’s own understanding of Indian thought. The document in question is a letter written by Thomas Masaryk (1850—1937) in 1876, while Masaryk (who later was to rise to fame as the thunder and first president of the Czechoslovakian state) was still a student of philosophy. The letter is addressed to Franz Brentano who had been for some years Masaryk’s teacher at the University of Vienna, the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was written from Leipzig in Germany where Masaryk moved in order to continue his studies. On 23 November 1876, he writes to Brentano.... The intelligentsia turned to Schopenhauerianism because （）.
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