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Many theories concerning the causes of juvenile delinquency ( crimes committed by young people) focus either on the individual or on society as the major contributing influence. Theories (21) on the individual suggest that children engage in criminal behavior (22) they were not sufficiently penalized for previous misdeeds or that they have learned criminal behavior through (23) with others. Theories focusing on the role of society suggest that children commit crimes in (24) to their failure to rise above their socioeconomic status, (25) as a rejection of middle-class values. Most theories of juvenile delinquency have focused on children from disadvantaged families, (26) the fact that children from wealthy homes also commit crimes. The latter may commit crimes (27) lack of adequate parental control. All theories, however, are tentative and are (28) to criticism. Changes in the social structure may indirectly (29) juvenile crime rates. For example, changes in the economy that (30) to fewer job opportunities for youth and rising unemployment (31) make gainful employment increasingly difficult to obtain. The resulting discontent may in (32) lead more youths into criminal behavior. Families have also (33) changes these years. More families consist of one-parent households or two working parents; (34) , children are likely to have less supervision at home (35) was common in the traditional family structure. 21().
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In the preceding chapter, economic welfare was taken broadly to consist of that group of satisfactions and dissatisfactions which can be brought into relation with a money measure. We have now to observe that this relation is not a direct one, but is mediated through desires and aversions. That is to say, the money that a person is prepared to offer for a thing measures directly, not the satisfaction he will get from the thing, but the intensity of his desire for it. This distinction, obvious when stated, has been somewhat obscured for English-speaking students by the employment of the term utility——which naturally carries an association with satisfaction——to represent intensity of desire. Thus, when one thing is desired by a person more keenly than another, it is said to possess a greater utility to that person. Several writers have endeavored to get rid of the confusion which this use of words generates by substituting "utility," in the above sense for some other term, such as "desirability". The term "desiredness" seems, however, to be preferable, because, since it cannot be taken to have any ethical implication, it is less ambiguous. I shall myself employ that term.Generally speaking, everybody prefers present pleasures or satisfactions of given magnitude to future pleasures or satisfactions of equal magnitude, even when the latter are perfectly certain to occur. But this preference for present pleasures does not——the idea is serf-contradictory——imply that a present pleasure of given magnitude is any greater than a future pleasure of the same magnitude. It implies only that our telescopic faculty is defective, and that we, therefore, see future pleasures, as it were, on a diminished scale. That this is the right explanation is proved by the fact that exactly the same diminution is experienced when, apart from our tendency to forget ungratifying incidents, we contemplate the past.Our analysis also suggests that economic welfare could be increased by some rightly chosen degree of differentiation in favor of saving. Nobody, of course, holds that the State should force its citizens to act as though so much objective wealth now and in the future were of exactly equal importance. In view of the uncertainty of productive developments, to say nothing of the mortality of nations and eventually of the human race itself, this would not, even in the extremest theory, be sound policy. But there is wide agreement that the State should protect the interests of the future in some degree against the effects of our irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over our descendants. The whole movement for "conservation" in the United States is based on this conviction.It is the clear duty of Government, which is the trustee for unborn generations as well as for its pre sent citizens, to watch over, and, if need be, by legislative enactment, to defend, the exhaustible natural resources of the country from rash and reckless spoliation.Plainly, ff we assume adequate competence on the part of governments, there is a valid case for some artificial encouragement to investment, particularly to investments the return from which will only begin to appear after the lapse of many years. It must, however, be remembered that, so long as people are left free to decide for themselves how much work they will do, interference, by fiscal or any other means, with the way they employ the resources that their work yields to them may react to diminish the aggregate amount of this work and so of those resources. In the opening paragraph, why does the author prefer to use the term "desiredness"().
One year ago we stared aghast at images of the Southeast Asian tsunami. Video cameras taken on vacation to record the everyday pleasures of the beach were suddenly turned to quivering utility as they documented the panic and mayhem of a natural disaster. Who can forget the disbelief in the recorded voices This can’t be happening to us. Human beings are never prepared for natural disasters. There is a kind of optimism built into our species that seems to prefer to live in the comfortable present rather than confront the possibility of destruction, It may happen, we seem to believe, but not now, and not to us. Mount Vesuvius has been erupting since historical records began. The eruption of A. D. 79 both destroyed Pompeii and preserved it for posterity. Pliny the Younger starkly recorded the details in prose that can still be read as a scientific ac-count. Yet houses are still being erected today at vulnerable sites around Vesuvius, in the face of the geological inevitability of further eruptions.Disasters are described as "acts of God". Whenever a natural catastrophe occurs, old questions resurface. How can we reconcile tragedy with the idea of a beneficent God And with that question, the notion of punishment is never far behind. If classical religions were wont to attribute disasters to the wrath of the gods, even in this scientific age the old explanations still have their attractions. And who might not sneakily still wish to believe that a saint could intercede on our behalfBut there is another kind of disaster. Many scientists think that the Gulf Coast hurricanes may be a symptom of climate change. Carbon emissions have been accelerating more rapidly within a generation or two: this is not the result of some creeping plate indifferent to the fate of humans; this is our responsibility. However, there is still the same, almost willful blindness to the dangers of climate change; after all, the sun still rises, the crops still ripen--why worry Geology tells us that there have been "green-house worlds" in the distant past. These have been times when seas flooded over continents. Even modest sea-level rises would spell the end of densely populated areas of the world like Bangladesh. In such a case, invoking the God to look after us for the best is just pie in the sky. These are not "acts of God" but acts of man. We should be ashamed of the consequences of our own willing blindness. The statement "greenhouse worlds" (Line 7, Para. 3) most probably means ().
One year ago we stared aghast at images of the Southeast Asian tsunami. Video cameras taken on vacation to record the everyday pleasures of the beach were suddenly turned to quivering utility as they documented the panic and mayhem of a natural disaster. Who can forget the disbelief in the recorded voices This can’t be happening to us. Human beings are never prepared for natural disasters. There is a kind of optimism built into our species that seems to prefer to live in the comfortable present rather than confront the possibility of destruction, It may happen, we seem to believe, but not now, and not to us. Mount Vesuvius has been erupting since historical records began. The eruption of A. D. 79 both destroyed Pompeii and preserved it for posterity. Pliny the Younger starkly recorded the details in prose that can still be read as a scientific ac-count. Yet houses are still being erected today at vulnerable sites around Vesuvius, in the face of the geological inevitability of further eruptions.Disasters are described as "acts of God". Whenever a natural catastrophe occurs, old questions resurface. How can we reconcile tragedy with the idea of a beneficent God And with that question, the notion of punishment is never far behind. If classical religions were wont to attribute disasters to the wrath of the gods, even in this scientific age the old explanations still have their attractions. And who might not sneakily still wish to believe that a saint could intercede on our behalfBut there is another kind of disaster. Many scientists think that the Gulf Coast hurricanes may be a symptom of climate change. Carbon emissions have been accelerating more rapidly within a generation or two: this is not the result of some creeping plate indifferent to the fate of humans; this is our responsibility. However, there is still the same, almost willful blindness to the dangers of climate change; after all, the sun still rises, the crops still ripen--why worry Geology tells us that there have been "green-house worlds" in the distant past. These have been times when seas flooded over continents. Even modest sea-level rises would spell the end of densely populated areas of the world like Bangladesh. In such a case, invoking the God to look after us for the best is just pie in the sky. These are not "acts of God" but acts of man. We should be ashamed of the consequences of our own willing blindness. What’s the "another kind of disaster" (Line 1, Para. 3)().
In the preceding chapter, economic welfare was taken broadly to consist of that group of satisfactions and dissatisfactions which can be brought into relation with a money measure. We have now to observe that this relation is not a direct one, but is mediated through desires and aversions. That is to say, the money that a person is prepared to offer for a thing measures directly, not the satisfaction he will get from the thing, but the intensity of his desire for it. This distinction, obvious when stated, has been somewhat obscured for English-speaking students by the employment of the term utility——which naturally carries an association with satisfaction——to represent intensity of desire. Thus, when one thing is desired by a person more keenly than another, it is said to possess a greater utility to that person. Several writers have endeavored to get rid of the confusion which this use of words generates by substituting "utility," in the above sense for some other term, such as "desirability". The term "desiredness" seems, however, to be preferable, because, since it cannot be taken to have any ethical implication, it is less ambiguous. I shall myself employ that term.Generally speaking, everybody prefers present pleasures or satisfactions of given magnitude to future pleasures or satisfactions of equal magnitude, even when the latter are perfectly certain to occur. But this preference for present pleasures does not——the idea is serf-contradictory——imply that a present pleasure of given magnitude is any greater than a future pleasure of the same magnitude. It implies only that our telescopic faculty is defective, and that we, therefore, see future pleasures, as it were, on a diminished scale. That this is the right explanation is proved by the fact that exactly the same diminution is experienced when, apart from our tendency to forget ungratifying incidents, we contemplate the past.Our analysis also suggests that economic welfare could be increased by some rightly chosen degree of differentiation in favor of saving. Nobody, of course, holds that the State should force its citizens to act as though so much objective wealth now and in the future were of exactly equal importance. In view of the uncertainty of productive developments, to say nothing of the mortality of nations and eventually of the human race itself, this would not, even in the extremest theory, be sound policy. But there is wide agreement that the State should protect the interests of the future in some degree against the effects of our irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over our descendants. The whole movement for "conservation" in the United States is based on this conviction.It is the clear duty of Government, which is the trustee for unborn generations as well as for its pre sent citizens, to watch over, and, if need be, by legislative enactment, to defend, the exhaustible natural resources of the country from rash and reckless spoliation.Plainly, ff we assume adequate competence on the part of governments, there is a valid case for some artificial encouragement to investment, particularly to investments the return from which will only begin to appear after the lapse of many years. It must, however, be remembered that, so long as people are left free to decide for themselves how much work they will do, interference, by fiscal or any other means, with the way they employ the resources that their work yields to them may react to diminish the aggregate amount of this work and so of those resources. In the fourth paragraph, the author makes it clear that ().
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