题目内容
Questions 7～10 School teacher Shana Richey misses the play room she decorated with Glamour Girl decals for her daughters. Fireman Jay Fernandez misses the custom putting green he installed in his back yard. But ever since they quit paying their mortgages and walked away from their homes, they’ve discovered that giving up on the American dream has its benefits. Both now live on the 3,100 block of Club Rancho Drive in Palmdale, where a terrible housing market lets them rent luxurious homes—one with a pool for the kids, the other with a golf-course view—for a fraction of their former monthly payments. "It’s just a better life. It really is," says Ms. Richey. Before defaulting on her mortgage, she owed about $ 230,000 more than the home was worth. People’s increasing willingness to abandon their own piece of America illustrates a paradoxical change wrought by the housing bust: Even as it tarnishes the near-sacred image of home ownership, it might be clearing the way for an economic recovery. Thanks to a rare confluence of factors—mortgages that far exceed home values and bargain-basement rents—a growing number of families are concluding that the new American dream home is a rental. Some are leaving behind their homes and mortgages right away, while others are simply halting payments until the bank kicks them out. That’s freeing up cash to use in other ways. Ms. Richey’s family of five used some of the money to buy season tickets to Disneyland, and plans to take a Carnival cruise to Mexico in March. Mr. Fernandez takes his girlfriend out to dinner more frequently. "We’re saving lots of money," Ms. Richey says. The U. S. home-ownership rate has charted its biggest decline in more than two decades, falling to 67.6% as of September from a peak of 69.2% in 2004. And more renters are on the way: Credit firm Experian and consulting firm Oliver Wyman forecast that "strategic defaults" by homeowners who can afford to pay are likely to exceed one million in 2009, more than four times 2007’s level. Stiffing the bank is bad for peoples’ credit, and bad for banks. Swelling defaults could also mean more losses for taxpayers through bank bailouts. Analysts at Deutsche Bank Securities expect 21 million U. S. households to end up owing more on their mortgages than their homes are worth by the end of 2010. If one in five of those households default, the losses to banks and investors could exceed $ 400 billion. As a proportion of the economy, that’s roughly equivalent to the losses suffered in the savings-and-loan debacle of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The flip side of those losses, though, is massive debt relief that can help offset the pain of rising unemployment and put cash in consumers’ pockets. For the 4. 8 million U. S. households that data provider LPS Applied Analytics estimates haven’t paid their mortgages in at least three months, the added cash flow could amount to about $ 5 billion a month—an injection that in the long term could be worth more than the tax breaks in the Obama administration’s economic-stimulus package. "It’s a stealth stimulus," says Christopher Thornberg of Beacon Economics, a consulting firm specializing in real estate and the California economy. "The quicker these people shed their debts, the faster the economy is going to heal and move forward again. " As the stigma of abandoning a mortgage wanes, the Obama administration could face an uphill battle in its effort to keep people in their homes by pressuring hanks to cut their mortgage payments. Some analysts argue that’s not always the right approach, particularly if it prevents people from shedding onerous debts and starting a fresh. "The effect of these programs is often to lead homeowners to make decisions that are not in their economic best interests," says Brent White, a law professor at the University of Arizona who has studied mortgage defaults.1.Why do the two families move out from their homes
查看答案
搜索结果不匹配？点我反馈
更多问题
债券的流动性主要取决于债券收益的稳定性。( )
主任科员是非领导职务。 ( )
Questions 1～5 In early June, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—the club of the world’s wealthy and almost wealthy nations released a 208-page document perversely titled "Pensions at a Glance". Inside is a rundown of how generous OECD members are to their burgeoning ranks of retirees. The US is near the bottom, with the average wage earner able to count on a government-mandated pension for just 52.4% of what he got (after taxes) in his working days—and higher-income workers even less. But the picture at the other end of the scale (dominated by Continental Europe) is misleading. Most of these governments haven’t put aside money for pensions. As the ranks of retirees grow and workforces do not, countries will have to either renege on commitments or tax the hides off future workers. What the OECD data seem to suggest is that you can run a retirement plan that’s fiscally sound but stingy, or you can make big promises that will eventually go sour. The US fits mostly in the former category—for all the gnashing of teeth about Social Security, its funding problems are modest by global standards. But is that really the choice Actually, no. At least one country appears to have found a better way. In the Netherlands—"the globe’s No.1 pensions country," says influential retirement-plan consultant Keith Ambachtsheer—the average retiree can count on a pension equal to 96.8% of his working income. Ample money is set aside to fund pensions, and it is invested prudently but not timidly. Companies contribute to employees’ accounts but aren’t stuck with profit-killing obligations if their business shrinks or the stock market tanks. The Dutch have steered a middle way between irresponsible Continental generosity and practical Anglo-American stinginess. They have also, to lapse into pension jargon, split the difference between DB and DC plans. In a defined-benefit (DB) plan, workers are promised a retirement income, and the sponsor—usually a corporation or government—is on the hook to provide it. In a defined-contribution (DC) plan, the worker and sometimes the employer set aside money and hope it will be enough. The big problem with DB is that sponsors are prone to lowball or ignore the true cost. In the U. S. , where corporate pensions provide a key supplement to Social Security, Congress has felt the need to pass multiple laws aimed at preventing companies from underfunding them. In response, some companies spent billions shoring up their funds; many others simply stopped offering pensions. Just since 2004, at least 66 big companies have frozen or terminated their DB plans, estimates Barclays Global Investors. Corporate DB has given way to individual DC plans like the 401(k) and IRA, but these put too much responsibility on the shoulders of individual workers. Many don’t save enough money, and those who do set aside enough earn returns that are on average much lower than those of pension funds. The Netherlands, like the US, has long relied on workplace pensions to supplement its government plan. The crucial difference is that these pensions were mandatory. Smaller employers had to band together to make a go of it, and industry-wide funds became standard. Run more as independent cooperatives than as captive corporate divisions, the Dutch funds were less prone to underfunding than their US counterparts. When they nonetheless ran into financial trouble in 2002 after the stock market crashed and interest rates sank, the country came up with a unique response. The Dutch funds are now no longer on the hook for providing a set income in retirement no matter what happens to financial markets that is, they’ve gone DC—but they didn’t shunt everything to individual workers. Risks are shared by all the members of a pension fund, and the money is managed by professionals. Pension consultant Ambachtsheer argues that this "collective DC" is just what the U. S. needs. Many companies here are improving 401(k)s to give employees more guidance, and there’s talk in Washington of supplementing (not supplanting) Social Security with near mandatory retirement accounts. But even those changes would fall well short of going Dutch. Countries don’t always set aside enough money to pay for the pensions they promise. The 2002 financial trouble of Netherlands is mentioned in the passage to show ______.
案情：2005年1月1日，甲与乙口头约定，甲承租乙的一套别墅，租期为五年，租金一次付清，交付租金后即可入住。洽谈时，乙告诉甲屋顶有漏水现象。为了尽快与女友丙结婚共同生活，甲对此未置可否，付清租金后与丙入住并办理了结婚登记。入住后不久别墅屋顶果然漏水，甲要求乙进行维修，乙认为在订立合同时已对漏水问题提前作了告知，甲当时并无异议，仍同意承租，故现在乙不应承担维修义务。于是，甲自购了一批瓦片，找到朋友开的丁装修公司免费维修。丁公司派工人更换了漏水的旧瓦片，同时按照甲的意思对别墅进行了较大装修。更换瓦片大约花了10天时间．装修则用了一个月，乙不知情。更换瓦片时，一名工人不慎摔伤，花去医药费数千元。2005年6月，由于新换瓦片质量问题，别墅屋顶出现大面积漏水，造成甲一万余元财产损失。2006年4月，甲遇车祸去世，丙回娘家居住。半年后丙返回别墅，发现戊已占用别墅。原来，2004年12月甲曾向戊借款10万元，并亲笔写了借条，借条中承诺在不能还款时该别墅由戊使用。在戊向乙出示了甲的亲笔承诺后，乙同意戊使用该别墅，将房屋的备用钥匙交付于戊。问题： 丙应如何向戊主张自己的权利理由是什么？
微信支付 
支付宝支付