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某原子的两个价电子处于3s4s组态，它吸收一能量合适的光子后，可直接跃迁到下列哪个组态（）
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There is one last question I must deal with in this chapter. Why should human beings be moral Another way of putting the problem is as follows. Is there any clear foundation or basis for morality Can any reasons be found for human beings to be good and do right acts rather than he bad and do wrong actsI have already pointed out the difficulties involved in founding morality on religion, and especially on religion as a safe factor. (1) However, if a person has religious faith, then he or she does have a foundation for a personal morality, even though this foundation is basically psychological rather than logical in nature. What disturbs me about the use of religion as the foundation of morality is the frequently-made assumption that if there is no supernatural or religious basis for morality, then there can be no basis at all. A related, and perhaps deeper, statement is that there can be no real meaning to human life. unless there is some sort of afterlife or some other extra-natural reason for living. (2) It is obvious that for many individuals this is psychologically true. that is, they feel that their existence has meaning and purpose and that they have a reason for being moral if and only if there is a God, an afterlife, or some sort of religion in their lives. I feel that we must respect this point of view and accept the conviction of the many people who hold it, because that is how they feel about life and morality.It is also obvious, however, that many people do not feel this way. (3) I think it is terribly presumptuous of religious believers to feel that if some people do not have a religious commitment, their lives are meaningless, or that such people have no reason for being moral in their actions. But if religion does not necessarily provide a "why" for morality, then what does Let us assume for a moment that there is no supernatural morality and see if we can find any other reasons why people should be moral.Enlightened Self-InterestOne can certainly argue on a basis of enlightened self-interest, that it is, at the very least, generally better to be good rather than bad and to create a world and society that is good rather than one that is bad. As a matter of fact, self-interest is the sole basis of one ethical theory, ethical egoism. I am not, however, suggesting at this point that one ought to pursue one’s own self-interest. I am merely presenting the argument that if everyone tried to do and be good and to avoid and prevent bad, it would be in everyone’s self-interest. For example, if within a group of people no one killed, stole, lied, or cheated, then each member of the group would benefit. (4) An individual member of the group could say, "It’s in my self-interest to do good rather than bad because I stand to benefit if I do and also because I could be ostracized or punished if I don’t. " Therefore, even though it is not airtight, the argument from enlightened self-interest is a somewhat compelling one.Argument from Tradition and LawRelated to the foregoing argument is the argument from tradition and law. This argument suggests that because traditions and laws, established over a long period of time, govern the behavior of human beings and because these traditions and laws urge human beings to be moral rather than immoral, there are good reasons for being so. (5) Self-interest is one reason, but another is respect for the human thought and effort that has gone into establishing such laws and traditions and transferring them from one historic period and one culture to another. This can be an attractive argument, even though it tends to suppress questioning of traditions and laws—a kind of questioning that is, I feel, the very touchstone of creative moral reasoning. It is interesting to note that most of us probably learned morality through being confronted with this argument, the religious argument, and the experiences surrounding them. Don’t we all remember being told we should or should not do something because it was or was not in our own self-interest, because God said it was right or wrong, or because it was the way we were supposed to act in our family, school, society, and world I think it is terribly presumptuous of religious believers to feel that if some people do not have a religious commitment, their lives are meaningless, or that such people have no reason for being moral in their actions.
以下说法有几个正确（） （1）不受外力作用的系统，它的总动量必然守恒； （2）不受外力作用的系统，它的总机械能必然守恒； （3）只有保守内力作用而不受外力作用的系统，它的总动量和总机械能必然都守恒
There is one last question I must deal with in this chapter. Why should human beings be moral Another way of putting the problem is as follows. Is there any clear foundation or basis for morality Can any reasons be found for human beings to be good and do right acts rather than he bad and do wrong actsI have already pointed out the difficulties involved in founding morality on religion, and especially on religion as a safe factor. (1) However, if a person has religious faith, then he or she does have a foundation for a personal morality, even though this foundation is basically psychological rather than logical in nature. What disturbs me about the use of religion as the foundation of morality is the frequently-made assumption that if there is no supernatural or religious basis for morality, then there can be no basis at all. A related, and perhaps deeper, statement is that there can be no real meaning to human life. unless there is some sort of afterlife or some other extra-natural reason for living. (2) It is obvious that for many individuals this is psychologically true. that is, they feel that their existence has meaning and purpose and that they have a reason for being moral if and only if there is a God, an afterlife, or some sort of religion in their lives. I feel that we must respect this point of view and accept the conviction of the many people who hold it, because that is how they feel about life and morality.It is also obvious, however, that many people do not feel this way. (3) I think it is terribly presumptuous of religious believers to feel that if some people do not have a religious commitment, their lives are meaningless, or that such people have no reason for being moral in their actions. But if religion does not necessarily provide a "why" for morality, then what does Let us assume for a moment that there is no supernatural morality and see if we can find any other reasons why people should be moral.Enlightened Self-InterestOne can certainly argue on a basis of enlightened self-interest, that it is, at the very least, generally better to be good rather than bad and to create a world and society that is good rather than one that is bad. As a matter of fact, self-interest is the sole basis of one ethical theory, ethical egoism. I am not, however, suggesting at this point that one ought to pursue one’s own self-interest. I am merely presenting the argument that if everyone tried to do and be good and to avoid and prevent bad, it would be in everyone’s self-interest. For example, if within a group of people no one killed, stole, lied, or cheated, then each member of the group would benefit. (4) An individual member of the group could say, "It’s in my self-interest to do good rather than bad because I stand to benefit if I do and also because I could be ostracized or punished if I don’t. " Therefore, even though it is not airtight, the argument from enlightened self-interest is a somewhat compelling one.Argument from Tradition and LawRelated to the foregoing argument is the argument from tradition and law. This argument suggests that because traditions and laws, established over a long period of time, govern the behavior of human beings and because these traditions and laws urge human beings to be moral rather than immoral, there are good reasons for being so. (5) Self-interest is one reason, but another is respect for the human thought and effort that has gone into establishing such laws and traditions and transferring them from one historic period and one culture to another. This can be an attractive argument, even though it tends to suppress questioning of traditions and laws—a kind of questioning that is, I feel, the very touchstone of creative moral reasoning. It is interesting to note that most of us probably learned morality through being confronted with this argument, the religious argument, and the experiences surrounding them. Don’t we all remember being told we should or should not do something because it was or was not in our own self-interest, because God said it was right or wrong, or because it was the way we were supposed to act in our family, school, society, and world Self-interest is one reason, but another is respect for the human thought and effort that has gone into establishing such laws and traditions and transferring them from one historic period and one culture to another. This can be an attractive argument, even though it tends to suppress questioning of traditions and laws—a kind of questioning that is, I feel, the very touchstone of creative moral reasoning.
The racial theory of civilization has ceased to be scientifically respectable. Today we only know it as a sophistical excuse for national pride and national hatred. The idea that there is a European race whose peculiar virtue render it fit to dominate the rest of the world, or an English race whose innate qualities make imperialism a duty, or a Nordic race whose predominance in America is the necessary condition of American greatness, and whose purity in Germany is indispensable to the purity of German culture, we know is scientifically baseless and politically disastrous. We know that physical anthropology and cultural anthropology are different studies, and we find it difficult to see how any one have confused them. Consequently we are not inclined to be grateful to Herder for having started so pernicious a doctrine.It would be possible to defend him by arguing that his theory of racial differences does not in itself give any ground for believing in the superiority of one race over another. One might argue that it only implies each type of man to have its own form of life, its own conception of happiness, and its own rhythm of historical development. On this showing, the social institutions and political forms of different peoples can differ without being intrinsically better or worse than one another, and the goodness of a certain political form is never an absolute goodness by only a goodness relative to the people that has created it.But this would not be a legitimate interpretation of Herder’s thought. It is essential to his whole point of view that the differences between the social and political institutions of different races are derived not from the historical experience of each race but from its innate psychological peculiarities, and this is fatal to a true understanding of history. The differentiations between different cultures which can be explained on these lines are not historical differentiations, like that between, say, Renaissance and Medieval cultures, but non-historical differentiations like that between a community of bees and a community of ants. Human nature has been divided up, but it is still human nature, still nature and not mind; and in terms of practical politics this means that the task of creating or improving a culture is assimilated to that of creating or improving a breed of domestic animals. Once Herder’s theory of race is accepted, there is no escaping the Nazi marriage laws.The problem which Herder bequeathed to his successors, therefore, was the problem of thinking out clearly the distinction between nature and man: nature as a process or sum of processes governed by laws which are blindly obeyed, man as a process or sum of processes governed (as Kant was to put it) not by law simply but by consciousness of law. It had to be shown that history is a process of this second type. that is to say, the life of man is an historical life because it is a mental and spiritual life.Herder’s first volume was published in the spring of 1784 when he was forty. Kant’s pupil had evidently read the book as soon as it appeared. Although Kant dissented from many of its doctrines, as his somewhat acid review was to show a year later, it did stimulate him to think for himself about the problems it raised and to write an essay of his own which constitutes his chief work on the philosophy of history. Kant was already sixty when he read the first part of the Ideen, and his mind had been formed by the Enlightenment as it took root in Germany under the aegis of Frederick the Great and of Voltaire, whom Frederick brought to the Prussian court. Hence Kant represents, as compared with Herder, a certain astringent tendency towards anti-Romanticism. In the true style of the Enlightenment, he regards past history as a spectacle of human irrationality and looks forward to a Utopia of rational life. What is really remarkable in him is the way in which he combines the Enlightenment point of view with the Romanticist, very much as in his theory of knowledge he combines rationalism and empiricism. The adjective "innate" (Line 3, Para. 3) is close in meaning to（）.
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