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请在“答题”菜单中选择“字处理”命令，然后按照题目要求打开相应的命令，完成下面的内容，具体要求如下： [文档开始] 8086/8088CPU的BIU和EU 从功能上看，8086分为两个部分——总线接口部件(Bus Interface Unit，BIU)和执行部件(Execution Unit，EU)。 BIU的主要功能是负责与存储器、I/O端口传送数据，即BIU要从内存取指令到指令队列，当CPU执行指令时，BIU要配合EU从指定的内存单元或者外设端口取数据，将数据传送给EU，或者把EU的操作结果传送到指定的内存单元或者外设端口。 EU的功能是执行指令。EU从指令队列中取出指令代码，将其译码，发出相应的控制信息。数据在ALU中进行运算，运算结果的特征保留在标志寄存器FLAGS中。 [文档结束] 打开文档WDA04.DOC。 [文档开始] X真值 [X] 0 0 12H 12H -32H 9EH -7FH 61H [文档结束] (1)对表格第1行第2列单元格中的内容“[X]”添加“补码”下标，设置表格居中，其表格中的文字左对齐。 (2)设置表格列宽为2厘米，外框线为蓝色1磅单实线，内框线为红色0.75磅单实线，第一行单元格为黄色底纹，并以原文件名保存文档。
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河南佳威手表厂，系一般纳税人，生产5个系列手表，在全国设立8个区域销售分公司。经税务师审核发票显示：本期购进钢材，取得增值税专用发票180张，注明价款合计 560万元；运费发票288张，注明运费金额合计389万元。煤炭增值税专用发票25张，注明价款128万元；电力增值税专用发票12张，注明价款合计158万元，自来水公司专用发票12张，注明水费价款58万元。白条购进低值易耗品价款188万元。 (1) 本期进口境外某厂家5个品牌高档手表作研发使用，经海关审核，5个型号的单价均超过2万元；境外口岸成交价为88万元，境外运费和保险费合计3.8万元，另外支付境外技术工艺及制图费用28万元。交纳进口环节税金，取得海关完税凭证。 (2) 分公司主要承接总部产品进行销售和推广。厂家给各个分公司发货，只开出发货单。发往上海分公司陀飞轮游龙戏凤钻表30只，每只表单位价款不含税98万元；发往武汉分公司珐琅掐丝彩绘手表20只，单位价款不含税2.8万元。发往全国其他区域分公司机械表共18899只，单位价款不含税为1580元。 (3) 为奥运会定制奥运标志手表共1000只，每只不含税单价3.88万元，已经全部在开幕式前发给奥委会组织者。 (4) 为某国内名表做贴牌生产，共生产800只，该厂为加工此批货物，耗用材料人工等成本为2800元，每只向委托方收取价税合计3800元。该表被收回后，全部以每只含税 6580元发给某营销公司用于客户赠送。 (5) 本期研发高档产品，共试生产新型号手表20只，每只成本为7800元。没有同类市场价格，本期全部用于推广宣传，赠送给各个宣传策划公司。 (6) 在厂部所在地区设立5家门市部，发货价格每只5000元，门市部对外销售的价格为每只零售价格12000元，本期共给门市发货35只，门市部对外销售21只。 (7) 将自产高档手表和尊贵红酒组成套装，每套零售价28000元，销给某五星级酒店。 280套，全部收到货款并开具普通发票。 (8) 本期外购税控系统专用设备，支付价税合计8万元，取得专用发票；安装时，又另外购进两台计算机和打印机，取得专用发票，注明价款4.28万元。 (9) 本期由于管理不善，购进钢材中，有5张钢板，发生锈蚀和弯曲，单位成本为5.89万元(其中含运费成本0.8万元)，单位将其用于仓库建设中。 (10) 向某汽车贸易公司购买一辆小轿车作自用，支付含增值税价款234000元，代收的保险费2500元，送车费700元，上牌费1800元，均由某汽车贸易公司开具发票。 (本期期初留抵税额为258万元，手表的消费税概率为20%，成本利润率为20%，关税税率为15%，上述分公司均依法办理了一般纳税人登记) 根据以上资料回答下列问题： 本期向税务机构应纳消费税为（）万元。
请在“答题”菜单中选择“字处理”命令，然后按照题目要求打开相应的命令，完成下面的内容，具体要求如下： [文档开始] 8086/8088CPU的BIU和EU 从功能上看，8086分为两个部分——总线接口部件(Bus Interface Unit，BIU)和执行部件(Execution Unit，EU)。 BIU的主要功能是负责与存储器、I/O端口传送数据，即BIU要从内存取指令到指令队列，当CPU执行指令时，BIU要配合EU从指定的内存单元或者外设端口取数据，将数据传送给EU，或者把EU的操作结果传送到指定的内存单元或者外设端口。 EU的功能是执行指令。EU从指令队列中取出指令代码，将其译码，发出相应的控制信息。数据在ALU中进行运算，运算结果的特征保留在标志寄存器FLAGS中。 [文档结束] 将标题段中的中文设置为三号、蓝色、黑体，英文设置为三号、蓝色、Arial字体；标题段居中，字符间距加宽2磅。 (2)将正文各段文字的中文设置为四号、宋体，英文设置为四号、Arial字体；将文中所有的“数据”加着重号，各段落首行缩进0.74厘米，段前间距10磅。 (3)将正文第三段分为等宽的2栏，栏宽为7厘米，并以原文件名保存。
This spring, disaster loomed in the global food market. Precipitous increases in the prices of staples like rice (up more than a hundred and fifty percent in a few months) and maize provoked food riots, toppled governments, and threatened the lives of tens of millions. But the bursting of the commodity bubble eased those pressures, and food prices, while still high, have come well off the astronomical levels they hit in April. For American, the drop in commodity prices has put a few more bucks in people’s pockets; in much of the developing world, it may have saved many from actually starving. So did the global financial crisis solve the global food crisis Temporarily, perhaps. But the recent price drop doesn’t provide any long-term respite from the threat food shortages or future price spikes. Nor has it reassured anyone about the health of the global agricultural system, which the crisis revealed as dangerously unstable. Four decades after the Green Revolution, and after waves of market reforms intended to transform agricultural production, we’re still having a hard time insuring that people simply get enough to eat, and we seen to be vulnerable to supply shocks than ever. It wasn’t supposed to be this way. Over the past two decades, countries around the world have moved away from their focus on "food security" and handed market forces a greater rote in shaping agricultural policy. Before the nineteen-eighties, developing countries had so-called "agricultural marketing boards", which would buy commodities from farmers at fixed prices (prices high enough to keep farmers farming), and then store them in strategic reserves that could be used in the event of bad harvests or soaring import prices. But in the eighties and nineties, often as part of structural-adjustment programs imposed by the I.M.F. or the World Blank, many marketing boards were eliminated or cut back, and grain reserves, deemed inefficient and unnecessary, were sold off. In the same way, structural-adjustment programs often did away with government investment in and subsidies to agriculture--more notably, subsidies for things like fertilizers and high-yield seeds.. The logic behind these reforms was simple: the market would allocate resources more efficiently than government, leading to greater productivity. Farmers, instead of growing subsidized maize and wheat at high cost, could concentrate on cash crops, like cashews and chocolate, and use the money they made to buy staple foods. If a country couldn’t compete in the global economy, production would migrate to countries that could. it was also assumed that, once governments stepped out of the way, private investment would flood into agriculture, boosting performance. And international aid seemed a more efficient way of relieving food crises than relying in countries to maintain surpluses and food-security programs, which are wasteful and costly. This "marketization" of agriculture has not, to be sure, been fully carried through. Subsidies are still endemic in rich countries and poor, while developing countries often place tariffs on imported food, which benefit their farmers but drive up prices for consumers. And in extreme circumstance countries restrict exports, hoarding food for their own citizens. Nonetheless, we clearly have a leaner, more market-friendly agriculture system than before. It looks, in fact, a bit like global manufacturing, with low inventories (wheat stocks are at their lowest since 1977), concentrated production (three countries provide ninety percent of corn exports, and five countries provide eighty percent of rice exports,) and fewer redundancies. Governments have a much smaller role, and public spending on agriculture has been cut sharply. The problem is that, while this system is undeniably more efficient, it’s also much more fragile. Bad weather in just a few countries can wreak havoc across the entire system. When prices spike as they did this spring, the result is food shortages and malnutrition in poorer countries, since they are far more dependent on imports and have few food reserves to draw on. And, while higher prices and market reforms were supposed to bring a boom in agricultural productivity, global crop yields actually rose less between 1990 and 2007 than they did in the previous twenty years, in part because in many developing countries private-sector agricultural investment never materialized, while the cutbacks in government spending left them with feeble infrastructures. These changes did not cause the rising prices of the past couple of years, but they have made them more damaging. The old emphasis on food security was undoubtedly costly, and often wasteful. But the redundancies it created also had tremendous value when things went wrong. And one sure thing about a system as complex as agriculture is that things will go wrong, often with devastating consequences. If the just-in-time system for producing cars runs into a hitch and the supply of cars shrinks for a while, people can easily adapt. When the same happens with food, people go hungry or even starve. That doesn’ t mean that we need to embrace price controls or collective farms, and there are sensible market reforms, like doing away with import tariffs, that would make developing-country consumers better off. But a few weeks ago Bill Clinton, no enemy of market reform, got it right when he said that we should help countries achieve "maximum agricultural self-sufficiency". Instead of a more efficient system. We should be trying to build a more reliable one. The food crisis revealed the global agricultural system as ______.
Patents, said Thomas Jefferson, should draw "a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not". As the value that society places on intellectual property has increased, that line has become murkier-and the cause of some embarrassment, too. Around the world, patent offices are being inundated with applications. In many cases, this represents the extraordinary inventiveness that is occurring in new fields such as the internet, genomics and nanotechnology. But another, less-acceptable reason for the flood is that patent offices have been too lax in granting patents, encouraging many firms to rush to patent as many, often dubious, ideas as possible in an effort to erect legal obstacles to competitors. The result has been a series of messy and expensive court battles, and growing doubts about the effectiveness of patent systems as a spur to innovation, just as their importance should be getting bigger. In 1998 America introduced so-called "business-method" patents, granting for the first time patent monopolies simply for new ways of doing business, many of which were not so new. This was a mistake. It not only ushered in a wave of new applications, but it is probably inhibiting, rather than encouraging, commercial innovation, which had never received, or needed, legal protection in the past. Europe has not, so far, made the same blunder, but the European Parliament is considering the easing of rules for innovations incorporated in software. This might have a similarly deleterious effect as business-method patents, because many of these have been simply the application of computers to long-established practices. In Japan, firms are winning large numbers of patents with extremely narrow claims, mostly to obfuscate what is new and so to ward off rivals. As more innovation happens in China and India, these problems are likely to spread there as well. There is an urgent need for patent offices to return to first principles. A patent is a government-granted temporary monopoly (patents in most countries are given about 20 years’ protection) intended to reward innovators in exchange for a disclosure by the patent holder of how his invention works, thereby encouraging others to further innovation. The qualifying tests for patents are straightforward--that an idea be useful, novel and not obvious. Unfortunately most patent offices, swamped by applications that can run to thousands of pages and confronted by companies wielding teams of lawyers, are no longer applying these tests strictly or reliably. For example, in America, many experts believe that dubious patents abound, such as the notorious one for a "sealed crustless sandwich". Of the few patents that are re-examined by the Patent and Trademark Office itself, often after complaints from others, most are invalidated or their claims clipped down. The number of duplicate claims among patents is far too high. What happens in America matters globally, since it is the world’s leading patent office, approving about 170,000 patents each year, half of which are granted to foreign applicants. Europe’s patent system is also in a mess in another regard: the quilt of national patent offices and languages means that the cost of obtaining a patent for the entire European Union is too high, a burden in particular on smaller firms and individual inventors. The European Patent Office may award a patent, but the patent holder must then file certified translations at national patent offices to receive protection. Negotiations to simplify this have gone on for over a decade without success. As a start, patent applications should be made public. In most countries they are, but in America this is the case only under certain circumstances, and after 18 months. More openness would encourage rivals to offer the overworked patent office evidence with which to judge whether an application is truly novel and non-obvious. Patent offices also need to collect and publish data about what happens once patents are granted--the rate at which they are challenged and how many are struck down. This would help to measure the quality of the patent system itself, and offer some way of evaluating whether it is working to promote innovation, or to impede it. But most of all, patent offices need to find ways of applying standards more strictly. This would make patents more difficult to obtain. But that is only right. Patents are, after all, government-enforced monopolies and so, as Jefferson had it, there should be some "embarrassment" (and hesitation in granting them. What’s wrong with Europe’s patent system
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