矛盾的普遍性与特殊性是矛盾的两种基本属性。 ( )
A. 对
B. 错
Questions 11~15 President Clinton’s decision on Apr. 8 to send Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji packing without an agreement on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization seemed to be a massive miscalculation. The President took a drubbing from much of the press, which had breathlessly reported that a deal was in the bag. The Cabinet and White House still appeared divided, and business leaders were characterized as furious over the lost opportunity. Zhu charged that Clinton lacked "the courage" to reach an accord. And when Clinton later telephoned the angry Zhu to pledge a renewed effort at negotiations, the gesture was widely portrayed as a flip-flop. In fact, Clinton made the right decision in holding out for a better WTO deal. A lot more horse trading is needed before a final agreement can be reached. And without the Administration’s goal of a " bullet-proof agreement" that business lobbyists can enthusiastically sell to a Republican Congress, the whole process will end up in partisan acrimony that could harm relations with China for years. THE HARD PART. Many business lobbyists, while disappointed that the deal was not closed, agree that better terms can still be had. And Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, National Economic Council Director Gene B. Sperling, Commerce Secretary William M. Daley, and top trade negotiator Charlene Barshefsky all advised Clinton that while the Chinese had made a remarkable number of concessions, "we’re not there yet," according to senior officials. Negotiating with Zhu over the remaining issues may be the easy part. Although Clinton can signal U. S. approval for China’s entry into the WTO himself, he needs Congress to grant Beijing permanent most-favored-nation status as part of a broad trade accord. And the temptation for meddling on Capital Hill may prove over-whelming. Zhu had barely landed before Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) declared himself skeptical that China deserved entry into the WTO. And Senators Jesse A. Helms (R-N. C.) and Ernest F. Hollings (D-S. C.) promised to introduce a bill requiring congressional approval of any deal. The hidden message from these three textile-state Southerners. Get more protection for the U.S. clothing industry. Hoping to smooth the way, the Administration tried, but failed, to budge Zhu on textiles. Also left in the lurch. Wall Street, Hollywood, and Detroit. Zhu refused to open up much of the lucrative Chinese securities market and insisted on "cultural" restrictions on American movies and music. He also blocked efforts to allow U. S. auto makers to provide fleet financing. BIG JOB. Already, business lobbyists are blanketing Capitol Hill to presale any eventual agreement, but what they’ve heard so far isn’t encouraging. Republicans, including Lott, say that "the time just isn’t right" for the deal. Translation: We’re determined to make it look as if Clinton has capitulated to the Chinese and is ignoring human, religious, and labor rights violations; the theft of nuclear-weapons technology; and the sale of missile parts to America’s enemies. Beijing’s fierce critics within the Democratic Party, such as Senator Paul D. Wellstone of Minnesota and House Minority leader Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, won’t help, either. Just how tough the lobbying job on Capitol Hill will be become clear on Apr. 20, when Rubin lectured 19 chief executives on the need to discipline their Republican allies. With business and the White House still trading charges over who is responsible for the defeat of fast-track trade negotiating legislation in 1997, working together won’t be easy. And Republicans—with a wink— say that they’ll eventually embrace China’s entry into the WTO as a favor to Corporate America, though not long before they torture Clinton. But Zhu is out on a limb, and if Congress overdoes the criticism, he may be forced by domestic critics to renege. Business must make this much dear to both its GOP allies and the White House. This historic deal is too important to risk losing to any more partisan squabbling. What was the attitude of the Republican Party toward China’s entry into the WTO
A. Contradictory.
B. Appreciative.
C. Disapproving.
Detestful.
Questions 1 to 5 are based on the following conversation.
A. For fun. B. For his disabled son.
B. C. For the prize he won. D. For selling the house at a higher price.
Questions 1~5 In early June, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—the club of the world’s wealthy and almost wealthy nations released a 208-page document perversely titled "Pensions at a Glance". Inside is a rundown of how generous OECD members are to their burgeoning ranks of retirees. The US is near the bottom, with the average wage earner able to count on a government-mandated pension for just 52.4% of what he got (after taxes) in his working days—and higher-income workers even less. But the picture at the other end of the scale (dominated by Continental Europe) is misleading. Most of these governments haven’t put aside money for pensions. As the ranks of retirees grow and workforces do not, countries will have to either renege on commitments or tax the hides off future workers. What the OECD data seem to suggest is that you can run a retirement plan that’s fiscally sound but stingy, or you can make big promises that will eventually go sour. The US fits mostly in the former category—for all the gnashing of teeth about Social Security, its funding problems are modest by global standards. But is that really the choice Actually, no. At least one country appears to have found a better way. In the Netherlands—"the globe’s No.1 pensions country," says influential retirement-plan consultant Keith Ambachtsheer—the average retiree can count on a pension equal to 96.8% of his working income. Ample money is set aside to fund pensions, and it is invested prudently but not timidly. Companies contribute to employees’ accounts but aren’t stuck with profit-killing obligations if their business shrinks or the stock market tanks. The Dutch have steered a middle way between irresponsible Continental generosity and practical Anglo-American stinginess. They have also, to lapse into pension jargon, split the difference between DB and DC plans. In a defined-benefit (DB) plan, workers are promised a retirement income, and the sponsor—usually a corporation or government—is on the hook to provide it. In a defined-contribution (DC) plan, the worker and sometimes the employer set aside money and hope it will be enough. The big problem with DB is that sponsors are prone to lowball or ignore the true cost. In the U. S. , where corporate pensions provide a key supplement to Social Security, Congress has felt the need to pass multiple laws aimed at preventing companies from underfunding them. In response, some companies spent billions shoring up their funds; many others simply stopped offering pensions. Just since 2004, at least 66 big companies have frozen or terminated their DB plans, estimates Barclays Global Investors. Corporate DB has given way to individual DC plans like the 401(k) and IRA, but these put too much responsibility on the shoulders of individual workers. Many don’t save enough money, and those who do set aside enough earn returns that are on average much lower than those of pension funds. The Netherlands, like the US, has long relied on workplace pensions to supplement its government plan. The crucial difference is that these pensions were mandatory. Smaller employers had to band together to make a go of it, and industry-wide funds became standard. Run more as independent cooperatives than as captive corporate divisions, the Dutch funds were less prone to underfunding than their US counterparts. When they nonetheless ran into financial trouble in 2002 after the stock market crashed and interest rates sank, the country came up with a unique response. The Dutch funds are now no longer on the hook for providing a set income in retirement no matter what happens to financial markets that is, they’ve gone DC—but they didn’t shunt everything to individual workers. Risks are shared by all the members of a pension fund, and the money is managed by professionals. Pension consultant Ambachtsheer argues that this "collective DC" is just what the U. S. needs. Many companies here are improving 401(k)s to give employees more guidance, and there’s talk in Washington of supplementing (not supplanting) Social Security with near mandatory retirement accounts. But even those changes would fall well short of going Dutch. Countries don’t always set aside enough money to pay for the pensions they promise. According to the report released by OECD, ______.
A. the US does not have big pension problems in comparison with other countries
B. continental Europe is in fact not doing that well with retirement-related issues
C. governments are generally reneging on their promises with pension problems
D. countries are all doing pretty well with retirement issues