Born in the trough of the Great Depression, Edmund Phelps, a professor at Columbia University who won the Nobel Prize for economics, has spent much of his intellectual life studying slumps of a different kind. The Depression, which cost both of his parents their jobs, was exacerbated by the monetary, authorities, who kept too tight a grip on the money supply. Mr. Phelps is interested in unemployment that even open-handed central bankers cannot cure. Most scholars stand on the shoulders of giants. But Mr. Phelps won his laurels in part tar kicking the feet from under his intellectual forerunners. In 1958 William Phillips, of the London School of Economics, showed that for much of the previous hundred years, unemployment was low in Britain when wage inflation was high, and high when inflation was low. Economists were too quick to conclude that policy makers therefore faced a grand, macroeconomic trade-off, embodied in the so-called "Phillips curve". They could settle for unemployment of, say, 6% and an inflation rate of 1%—as prevailed in America at the start of the 1960s—or they could quicken the economy, cutting unemployment by a couple of percentage points at the expense of inflation of 3% or so—which is roughly how things stood in America when Mr. Phelps published his first paper on the subject in 1967. In such a tight lab our market, companies appease workers by offering higher wages. They then pass on the cost in the form of dearer prices, cheating workers of a higher real wage. Thus policymakers can engineer lower unemployment only through deception. But "man is a thinking, expectant being,"as Mr. Phelps has put it. Eventually workers will cotton on, demanding still higher wages to offset the rising cost of living. They can be duped for as long as inflation stays one step ahead of their rising expectations of what it will be. The stable trade-off depicted by the Phillips curve is thus a dangerous mirage. The economy will recover its equilibrium only when workers’ expectations are fulfilled, prices turn out as anticipated, and they no longer sell their labour under false pretences. But equilibrium does not, sadly, imply full employment. Mr. Phelps argued that inflation will not settle until unemployment rises to its "natural rate", leaving some workers moldering on the shelf. Given economists’ almost theological commitment to the notion that markets clear, the presence of unemployment in the world requires a theodicy to explain it. Mr. Phelps is willing to entertain several. But in much of his work he contends that unemployment is necessary to cow workers, ensuring their loyalty to the company and their diligence on the job, at a wage the company can afford to pay. "Natural" does not mean optimal. Nor, Mr. Phelps has written, does it mean "a pristine element of nature not susceptible to intervention by man. " Natural simply means impervious to central bankers’ efforts to change it, how much money they print. Economists, including some of his own students, commonly take this natural rate to be slow moving, if not constant, and devote a great deal of effort to estimating it. Mr. Phelps, by contrast, has been more anxious to explain its fluctuations, and to recommend measures to lower it. His book Structural Slumps, published in 1994, is an ambitious attempt to provide a general theory of how the natural rate of unemployment evolves. Some of the factors that he considered important--unemployment benefits or payroll taxes, for example—are widely accepted parts of the story. Others are more idiosyncratic. He and his French collaborator, Jean-Paul Fitoussi, have, for example, blamed Europe’s mounting unemployment in the 1980s in part on Ronald Reagan’s budget deficits, which were expansionary at home, but squeezed employment in the rest of the world. A few years ago David Walsh, an economic journalist, lamented that the glare of the Nobel Prize left other equally deserving economists, such as Mr. Phelps, languishing "in the half-lit penumbra of the shortlist". After an unaccountably long lag, professional acclaim for this bold, purposeful theorist finally converged on its natural rate. According to Mr. Phelps, unemployment will resuh in all the following EXCEPT
A. . employees’ panic.
B. employees’ fidelity.
C. employees’ industriousness.
D. employees’ aspiration.
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Where can the two speakers probably be
A. Her brother’s son.
B. Her brother.
C. Her son.
Access 2000中,在操作数据库表时,如果要修改多处相同的数据,可以使用Access的_________功能,自动将查找到的数据更新为新数据。
Questions 7 and 8 are based on the following news. People protested against
A. the detention of Mr. Wudato Santallo.
B. the fraud elections.
C. the rising of taxes.
D. the police brutality.
For America’s colleges, January is a month of reckoning. Most applications for the next academic year beginning in the autumn have to be made by the end of December, so a university’s popularity is put to an objective standard: how many people want to attend. One of the more unlikely offices to have been flooded with mail is that of the City University of New York (CUNY), a public college that lacks, among other things, a famous sports team, pastoral campuses and boisterous parties (it doesn’t even have dorms), and, until recently, academic credibility. A primary draw at CUNY is a programmer for particularly clever students, launched in 2001. Some 1, 100 of the 60,000 students at CUNY’s five top schools receive a rare thing in the costly world of American colleges: free education. Those accepted by CUNY’s honors programmer pay no tuition fees; instead they receive a stipend of $7, 500 (to help with general expenses) and a laptop computer. Applications for early admissions into next year’s programme are up 70%. Admission has nothing to do with being an athlete, or a child of an alunmus, or having an influential sponsor, or being a member of a particularly aggrieved ethnic group—criteria that are increasingly important at America’s elite colleges. Most of the students who apply to the honours programme come from relatively poor families, many of them immigrant ones. All that CUNY demands is that these students be diligent and clever. Last year, the average standardised test score of this group was in the top 7% in the country. Among the rest of CUNY’s students averages are lower, but they are now just breaking into the top third (compared with the bottom third in 1997). CUNY does not appear alongside Harvard and Stanford on lists of America’s top colleges, but its recent transformation offers a neat parable of meritocracy revisited. Until the 1960s, a good case could be made that the best deal in American tertiary education was to be found not in Cambridge or Palo Alto, but in Harlem, at a small public school called City College, the core of CUNY. America’s first free municipal university, founded in 1847, offered its services to everyone bright enough to meet its grueling standards. City’s golden era came in the last century, when America’s best known colleges restricted the number of Jewish students they would admit at exactly the time when New York was teeming with the bright children of poor Jewish immigrants. In 1933—54 City produced nine future Nobel laureates, including the 2005 winner for economics, Robert Aumann (who graduated in 1950). What went wrong Put simply, City dropped its standards. It was partly to do with demography, partly to do with earnest muddle headedness. In the 1960s, universities across the country faced intense pressure to admit more minority students. Although City was open to all races, only a small number of black and Hispanic students passed the strict tests (including a future secretary of state, Colin Powell). That, critics decided, could not be squared with City’s mission to "serve all the citizens of New York". At first the standards were tweaked, but this was not enough, and in 1969 massive student protests shut down City’s campus for two weeks. Faced with upheaval, City scrapped its admissions standards altogether. By 1970, almost any student who graduated from New York’s high schools could attend. The quality of education collapsed. At first, with no barrier to entry, enrolment climbed, but in 1976 the city of New York, which was then in effect bankrupt, forced CUNY to impose tuition fees. An era of free education was over, and a university which had once served such a distinct purpose joined the muddle of America’s lower-end education. By 1997, seven out of ten first-year students in the CUNY system were failing at least one remedial test in reading, writing or moths ( meaning that they had not learnt it to high-school standard). A report commissioned by the city in 1999 concluded that "Central to CUNY’s historic mission is a commitment to provide broad access, but its students’ high drop-out rates and low graduation rates raise the question: Access to what\ Which of the following statements about the City University of New York is CORRECT
A. It has started to enjoy a high academic position.
B. The students often have get-togethers.
C. Its campuses are small and crowded.
D. In terms of sports, it is mediocre.