The single most shattering statistic about life in America in the late 1990s was that tobacco killed more people than the combined total of those who died from AIDS, car accidents, alcohol, murder, suicide, illegal drugs and fire. The deaths of more than 400, 000 Americans each year, 160, 000 of them from lung cancer, make a strong case for the prohibition of tobacco, and particularly of cigarettes. The case, backed by solid evidence, has been made in every public arena since the early 1950s, when the first convincing link between smoking and cancer was established in clinical and epidemiological studies—yet 50 million Americans still go on smoking. tobacco-related illness. It is a remarkable story, clearly told, astonishingly well documented and with a transparent moral motif. Most smokers in America eventually manage to quit, and local laws banning smoking in public have become common, but the industry prospers. The tobacco companies have survived virtually everything their opponents have thrown at them. At the end of his story, Mr. Brandt writes: "The legal assault on Big Tobacco had been all but repelled. The industry was decidedly intact, ready to do business profitably at home and abroad. "Although the conclusion is not to his liking, Mr. Brandt’s is the first full and convincing explanation of how they pulled it off. Cigarettes overcame any lingering opposition to the pleasure they gave when American soldiers came to crave them during the World War I. War, says Mr. Brandt, was "a critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as a dominant product in modern consumer culture. " Cigarettes were sexy, and the companies poured money into advertising. By 1950 Americans smoked 350 billion cigarettes a year and the industry accounted for 3.5% of consumer spending on non-durables. The first 50 years of the"cigarette century"were a golden era for Big Tobacco. That was simply because, until the 1940s, not enough men had been smoking for long enough to develop fatal cancers (women did not reach this threshold until the 1970s). The first clinical and epidemiological studies linking eigarette-smoking and lung cancer were published only in 1950. By 1953 the six leading companies had agreed that a collective response was required. They paid handsomely for a public-relations campaign that insistently denied any proof of a causal connection between smoking and cancer. This worked well until 1964, when a devastating report from the surgeon-general’s advisory committee in effect ended medical uncertainty about the harmfulness of smoking. But Big Tobacco rode the punches. When the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ruled that health warnings must appear on each pack, the industry, consented. But it shrewdly exploited the warning: "In a culture that emphasised individual responsibility, smokers would bear the blame for willful risk-taking," notes Mr. Brandt. Many cases for damages against the companies foundered on that rock. Cigarette-makers also marshaled their numerous allies in Congress to help the passage of a law that bypassed federal agencies such as the FTC, and made Congress itself solely responsible for tobacco regulation. Describing the pervasive influence of tobacco lobbyists, he says: "Legislation from Congress testified to the masterful preparation and strategic command of the tobacco industry. " However, the industry was powerless to prevent a flood of damaging internal documents, leaked by insiders. The companies were shown, for instance, to have cynically disregarded evidence from their in-house researchers about the addictive properties of nicotine. Internal papers also showed that extra nicotine was added to cigarettes to guarantee smokers sufficient" satisfaction". Despite such public-relations disasters, the industry continued to win judgments, most significantly when the Supreme Court rejected by five votes to four a potentially calamitous attack that would have given the Federal Drug Administration the power to regulate tobacco products. The industry’s shrewdest move was to defuse a barrage of eases brought by individual states, aiming to reclaim the cost of treating sick smokers. The states in 1998 accepted a settlement of $246 billion over 25 years (the price of a pack rose by 45 cents shortly afterwards). In return, the states agreed to end all claims against the companies. But the settlement tied the state governments to tobacco’s purse-strings; they now had an interest in the industry’s success. For those who thought the settlement was akin to" dancing with the devil", it appeared in retrospect that the devil had indeed had the best tunes, reports Mr. Brandt. To his credit, he manages to keep his historian’s hat squarely on his head. But you can feel the anguish. Which of the following might be the most appropriate title for the text
A. Tobacco
B. Tobacco Companies
C. An Evil Weed
D. A History. of the Cigarette
某生产企业位于城市郊区,公司相关情况如下: (1)该企业2010年初实际占用的60000平方米土地面积中,企业内的职工医院和托儿所共占地2000平方米,经批准改造的废弃土地占地5000平方米(已使用3年),厂区内直接用于鸡鸭养殖的用地6000平方米,除上述土地外,其余土地均为该企业生产经营用地。另外,2010年6月21日,经批准,此企业新征用非耕地5000平方米的土地使用权。 (2)2010年企业拥有10辆客车、自重为5吨的三轮汽车5辆、自重20吨的载货卡车10辆。 已知:当地政府规定,该地每平方米城镇土地使用税年税额为3元;载客汽车年单位税额450元,载货汽车的车船税税额为70元/吨。 要求:根据上述资料,回答下列小题。 该企业2010年所占用的土地中,可以享受税收减免的有()
A. 企业内职工医院和托儿所用地
B. 经批准改造的废弃土地
C. 厂区内直接用于鸡鸭养殖的用地
D. 经批准新征用的非耕地
某企业作为施工总承包,承揽了一大型工程的施工任务。该工程体量大,工期长,结构复杂,技术要求较高。该企业根据工程特点,将其划分为A,B,C,D四个部分,分别由其下属的四个工程队施工,组建了四个项目部,并成立了计划、技术、质量、安全、合同、财务等相关职能部门,编制了施工组织总设计,开展了风险分析等工作。 根据材料,回答以下问题: 为防范技术风险,该企业将B部分中一技术要求较高而自己又缺乏相应技术的部分分包给了装业分包商,这是风险响应策略中的( )。
A. 风险自留
B. 风险规避
C. 风险分担
D. 风险转移