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American hopes that pressure from the US will force Japan to suddenly dismantle its trade barriers are almost certain to evaporate in disappointment①. The fact is that Washington faces an obstacle far more formidable than a few power brokers in Tokyo’s government offices. It’s not in line with the centuries-old, deep-ingrained Japanese customs. To move the Japanese government, Washington government must move an entire nation. So far the US has had only limited success despite congressional threats to retaliate. In an April 9 nationwide broadcast, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone urged the Japanese to buy more imported goods and unveiled a long-awaited three-year plan to ease import restrictions. But this program was far short of what Washington hoped to see. White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan said the Japanese offered "few new or immediate measures." While the plan did promise fewer shackles on imports of telecommunications gear, medicine and medical equipment, it offered no relief for American forest products—which are among the most contentious trade issues. Nakasone gives every sign of being secure in his desire to reduce a Japanese surplus in trade with the US that hit 36.8 billion dollars in 1984 and could soon top billion. Yet to rely on any Japanese political leader, no matter how popular he is at home, to reverse trade policies is to underestimate the culture and traditions that weigh heavily against a breakthrough②. Big business and dozens of anonymous bureaucrats have as much power as Japan’s top elected leaders. "The whole concept that we can turn this around right now is obviously ridiculous," says an American trader who has lived and worked here since 1952. "The vested interests are being shaken and slowly moved, but at a pace too slow for the eye to follow." That view is echoed by a US diplomat closely involved in the efforts to open the Japanese market to American goods, Washington’s main solution to the ballooning trade ambulance. "Japan is a relationship society rather than a transactional one," he says. "You cannot alter that kind of a system with a television speech or a few general proposals, no matter how well-intended they are." Beyond specific tariffs or other official barriers to imports, experts here say that the US faces these obstacles. Nearly total domination of the Japanese market by a few dozen giant conglomerates that strongly op pose even token competition—be it from abroad or emerging domestic firms. An elite, thickly layered bureaucracy that historically has drafted laws and regulations as well as enforced them, and both of these powers would be threatened by trade reforms. A longtime relationship between business and government that critics say fosters collusion and hinders foreign entry into domestic markets③. According to the text, the main factor working against any immediate entry into Japanese market is ______.
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American hopes that pressure from the US will force Japan to suddenly dismantle its trade barriers are almost certain to evaporate in disappointment①. The fact is that Washington faces an obstacle far more formidable than a few power brokers in Tokyo’s government offices. It’s not in line with the centuries-old, deep-ingrained Japanese customs. To move the Japanese government, Washington government must move an entire nation. So far the US has had only limited success despite congressional threats to retaliate. In an April 9 nationwide broadcast, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone urged the Japanese to buy more imported goods and unveiled a long-awaited three-year plan to ease import restrictions. But this program was far short of what Washington hoped to see. White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan said the Japanese offered "few new or immediate measures." While the plan did promise fewer shackles on imports of telecommunications gear, medicine and medical equipment, it offered no relief for American forest products—which are among the most contentious trade issues. Nakasone gives every sign of being secure in his desire to reduce a Japanese surplus in trade with the US that hit 36.8 billion dollars in 1984 and could soon top billion. Yet to rely on any Japanese political leader, no matter how popular he is at home, to reverse trade policies is to underestimate the culture and traditions that weigh heavily against a breakthrough②. Big business and dozens of anonymous bureaucrats have as much power as Japan’s top elected leaders. "The whole concept that we can turn this around right now is obviously ridiculous," says an American trader who has lived and worked here since 1952. "The vested interests are being shaken and slowly moved, but at a pace too slow for the eye to follow." That view is echoed by a US diplomat closely involved in the efforts to open the Japanese market to American goods, Washington’s main solution to the ballooning trade ambulance. "Japan is a relationship society rather than a transactional one," he says. "You cannot alter that kind of a system with a television speech or a few general proposals, no matter how well-intended they are." Beyond specific tariffs or other official barriers to imports, experts here say that the US faces these obstacles. Nearly total domination of the Japanese market by a few dozen giant conglomerates that strongly op pose even token competition—be it from abroad or emerging domestic firms. An elite, thickly layered bureaucracy that historically has drafted laws and regulations as well as enforced them, and both of these powers would be threatened by trade reforms. A longtime relationship between business and government that critics say fosters collusion and hinders foreign entry into domestic markets③. Which of the following is NOT mentioned as one of the trade obstacles in the text
In recent decades child specialists have tried more and more to help parents with their children’s school behavior. Schools of education (31) tended to emphasize subject matter (32) what the children are being taught, but attention increasingly is being paid to the children themselves. One area (33) emphasized is the matter of a (34) developmental or "maturity" level--that is, the child’s (35) of readiness for starting school. Research demonstrated that a major (36) of children who fail in school (37) primarily because of their immaturity and their unreadiness for the work of the (38) that law designates: age five for kindergarten, age six for first grade. Common sense (39) us that not all five-year-olds have reached (40) average level of performance expected (41) age five. Thus many five-year-olds fail in kindergarten and six-year-olds fail in first grade (42) because of a "learning disability" or "attention deficit disorder" but simply because (43) are in a too-advanced grade. Experience has shown that the number of (44) learners can be substantially reduced by a policy of (45) every child’s readiness--that is, (46) level before beginning school. This concept has (47) widely. Many school systems now routinely provide not only readiness testing but also extra grade (48) : pre-kindergarten or "developmental" kindergarten for a year (49) full kindergarten; and pre-first grade for six-year-olds not fully (50) for first grade.
American hopes that pressure from the US will force Japan to suddenly dismantle its trade barriers are almost certain to evaporate in disappointment①. The fact is that Washington faces an obstacle far more formidable than a few power brokers in Tokyo’s government offices. It’s not in line with the centuries-old, deep-ingrained Japanese customs. To move the Japanese government, Washington government must move an entire nation. So far the US has had only limited success despite congressional threats to retaliate. In an April 9 nationwide broadcast, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone urged the Japanese to buy more imported goods and unveiled a long-awaited three-year plan to ease import restrictions. But this program was far short of what Washington hoped to see. White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan said the Japanese offered "few new or immediate measures." While the plan did promise fewer shackles on imports of telecommunications gear, medicine and medical equipment, it offered no relief for American forest products—which are among the most contentious trade issues. Nakasone gives every sign of being secure in his desire to reduce a Japanese surplus in trade with the US that hit 36.8 billion dollars in 1984 and could soon top billion. Yet to rely on any Japanese political leader, no matter how popular he is at home, to reverse trade policies is to underestimate the culture and traditions that weigh heavily against a breakthrough②. Big business and dozens of anonymous bureaucrats have as much power as Japan’s top elected leaders. "The whole concept that we can turn this around right now is obviously ridiculous," says an American trader who has lived and worked here since 1952. "The vested interests are being shaken and slowly moved, but at a pace too slow for the eye to follow." That view is echoed by a US diplomat closely involved in the efforts to open the Japanese market to American goods, Washington’s main solution to the ballooning trade ambulance. "Japan is a relationship society rather than a transactional one," he says. "You cannot alter that kind of a system with a television speech or a few general proposals, no matter how well-intended they are." Beyond specific tariffs or other official barriers to imports, experts here say that the US faces these obstacles. Nearly total domination of the Japanese market by a few dozen giant conglomerates that strongly op pose even token competition—be it from abroad or emerging domestic firms. An elite, thickly layered bureaucracy that historically has drafted laws and regulations as well as enforced them, and both of these powers would be threatened by trade reforms. A longtime relationship between business and government that critics say fosters collusion and hinders foreign entry into domestic markets③. It can be inferred from the text, the Japanese Prime Minister’s plan to relieve import restrictions would ______.
In recent decades child specialists have tried more and more to help parents with their children’s school behavior. Schools of education (31) tended to emphasize subject matter (32) what the children are being taught, but attention increasingly is being paid to the children themselves. One area (33) emphasized is the matter of a (34) developmental or "maturity" level--that is, the child’s (35) of readiness for starting school. Research demonstrated that a major (36) of children who fail in school (37) primarily because of their immaturity and their unreadiness for the work of the (38) that law designates: age five for kindergarten, age six for first grade. Common sense (39) us that not all five-year-olds have reached (40) average level of performance expected (41) age five. Thus many five-year-olds fail in kindergarten and six-year-olds fail in first grade (42) because of a "learning disability" or "attention deficit disorder" but simply because (43) are in a too-advanced grade. Experience has shown that the number of (44) learners can be substantially reduced by a policy of (45) every child’s readiness--that is, (46) level before beginning school. This concept has (47) widely. Many school systems now routinely provide not only readiness testing but also extra grade (48) : pre-kindergarten or "developmental" kindergarten for a year (49) full kindergarten; and pre-first grade for six-year-olds not fully (50) for first grade.
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