题目内容
某酒店位于市区中心地带，是一家集餐饮、食宿和娱乐为一体的综合性餐饮企业。酒店设有餐饮部、客户部、娱乐部等经营部门，各经营部门业务实行独立核算。2011年7月，酒店取得以下收入： (1)餐饮收入150万元； (2)住宿收入100万元； (3)出租商业用房取得租金收入10万元； (4)卡拉OK门票收入20万元、点歌费收入6万元、台位费收入30万元、烟酒和饮料赍收入50万元。 已知：服务业税率为5%，娱乐业税率为20%。 要求：根据上述资料，分析回答下列小题。 该酒店7月份取得的各项收入申报缴纳营业税的下列表述中正确的有( )。
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某工程项目工期短，有详细的设计施工图纸，承发包双方按《标准施工招标文件》的通用合同条款、专用条款等签订了施工承包合同。 根据材料，回答以下问题： 投标保证金有效期应当超出( )。
某建筑公司与业主方按《建设工程施工合同示范文本》(GF-99-0201)签订了土建施工单价合同，业主方又与某设备安装公司按上述合同示范文本签订了安装工程合同。合同约定安装设备由业主方供应到工地现场。 根据资料，回答以下问题： 施工中发现古墓和文物，承包方按要求采取保护措施，发生的费用由( )承担。
某建设单位投资建设项目，按施工总承包模式依据《建设工程工程量清单计价规范》(GB 50500—2008)编制招标文件，有7家施工单位参加了投标，A施工单位中标并按《建设工程项目管理规范》(GB/T 50326—2006)组织项目施工。 根据材料，回答以下问题： 根据《工程建设项目施工招投标办法》规定，施工投标保证金的数额一般不得超过投标价的( )。
The single most shattering statistic about life in America in the late 1990s was that tobacco killed more people than the combined total of those who died from AIDS, car accidents, alcohol, murder, suicide, illegal drugs and fire. The deaths of more than 400, 000 Americans each year, 160, 000 of them from lung cancer, make a strong case for the prohibition of tobacco, and particularly of cigarettes. The case, backed by solid evidence, has been made in every public arena since the early 1950s, when the first convincing link between smoking and cancer was established in clinical and epidemiological studies—yet 50 million Americans still go on smoking. tobacco-related illness. It is a remarkable story, clearly told, astonishingly well documented and with a transparent moral motif. Most smokers in America eventually manage to quit, and local laws banning smoking in public have become common, but the industry prospers. The tobacco companies have survived virtually everything their opponents have thrown at them. At the end of his story, Mr. Brandt writes: "The legal assault on Big Tobacco had been all but repelled. The industry was decidedly intact, ready to do business profitably at home and abroad. "Although the conclusion is not to his liking, Mr. Brandt’s is the first full and convincing explanation of how they pulled it off. Cigarettes overcame any lingering opposition to the pleasure they gave when American soldiers came to crave them during the World War I. War, says Mr. Brandt, was "a critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as a dominant product in modern consumer culture. " Cigarettes were sexy, and the companies poured money into advertising. By 1950 Americans smoked 350 billion cigarettes a year and the industry accounted for 3.5% of consumer spending on non-durables. The first 50 years of the"cigarette century"were a golden era for Big Tobacco. That was simply because, until the 1940s, not enough men had been smoking for long enough to develop fatal cancers (women did not reach this threshold until the 1970s). The first clinical and epidemiological studies linking eigarette-smoking and lung cancer were published only in 1950. By 1953 the six leading companies had agreed that a collective response was required. They paid handsomely for a public-relations campaign that insistently denied any proof of a causal connection between smoking and cancer. This worked well until 1964, when a devastating report from the surgeon-general’s advisory committee in effect ended medical uncertainty about the harmfulness of smoking. But Big Tobacco rode the punches. When the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ruled that health warnings must appear on each pack, the industry, consented. But it shrewdly exploited the warning: "In a culture that emphasised individual responsibility, smokers would bear the blame for willful risk-taking," notes Mr. Brandt. Many cases for damages against the companies foundered on that rock. Cigarette-makers also marshaled their numerous allies in Congress to help the passage of a law that bypassed federal agencies such as the FTC, and made Congress itself solely responsible for tobacco regulation. Describing the pervasive influence of tobacco lobbyists, he says: "Legislation from Congress testified to the masterful preparation and strategic command of the tobacco industry. " However, the industry was powerless to prevent a flood of damaging internal documents, leaked by insiders. The companies were shown, for instance, to have cynically disregarded evidence from their in-house researchers about the addictive properties of nicotine. Internal papers also showed that extra nicotine was added to cigarettes to guarantee smokers sufficient" satisfaction". Despite such public-relations disasters, the industry continued to win judgments, most significantly when the Supreme Court rejected by five votes to four a potentially calamitous attack that would have given the Federal Drug Administration the power to regulate tobacco products. The industry’s shrewdest move was to defuse a barrage of eases brought by individual states, aiming to reclaim the cost of treating sick smokers. The states in 1998 accepted a settlement of $246 billion over 25 years (the price of a pack rose by 45 cents shortly afterwards). In return, the states agreed to end all claims against the companies. But the settlement tied the state governments to tobacco’s purse-strings; they now had an interest in the industry’s success. For those who thought the settlement was akin to" dancing with the devil", it appeared in retrospect that the devil had indeed had the best tunes, reports Mr. Brandt. To his credit, he manages to keep his historian’s hat squarely on his head. But you can feel the anguish. To protect the industry, the tobacco companies did all the following EXCEPT
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